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Re-evaluating Syndicalist Opposition to the First World War 
 
Abstract 
 
It has been argued that support for the First World War by the important French 
syndicalist organisation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) has tended to 
obscure the fact that other national syndicalist organisations remained faithful to their 
professed workers’ internationalism: on this basis syndicalists beyond France, more than 
any other ideological persuasion within the organised trade union movement in 
immediate pre-war and wartime Europe, can be seen to have constituted an authentic 
movement of opposition to the war in their refusal to subordinate class interests to 
those of the state, to endorse policies of ‘defencism’ of the ‘national interest’ and to 
abandon the rhetoric of class conflict. This article, which attempts to contribute to a 
much neglected comparative historiography of the international syndicalist movement, 
re-evaluates the syndicalist response across a broad geographical field of canvas 
(embracing France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Britain and America) to reveal a rather more 
nuanced, ambiguous and uneven picture. While it highlights the distinctive nature of the 
syndicalist response compared with other labour movement trends, it also explores the 
important strategic and tactical limitations involved, including the dilemma of 
attempting to translate formal syndicalist ideological commitments against the war into 
practical measures of intervention, and the consequences of the syndicalists’ 
subordination of the political question of the war to the industrial struggle. 
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Introduction 
 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, amidst an extraordinary 
international upsurge in strike action, the ideas of revolutionary syndicalism connected 
and helped to produce mass workers’ movements in a number of different countries 
across the world. An increasing number of syndicalist unions were to emerge as either 
existing unions were won over to syndicalist principles or new alternative revolutionary 
unions and organisations were formed by dissidents who broke away from their 
mainstream reformist adversaries. This international movement experienced its 
greatest vitality in the period immediately preceding and following the First World War, 
although the movement in Spain crested later.  
 
 Of course ‘syndicalism’ is necessarily only a very broad term for a number of 
related but rather different revolutionary union movements that flourished in a variety 
of forms.1 Although it was an international phenomenon that grew out of similar 
economic, social and political conditions, syndicalism manifested itself concretely in 
direct relation to national conditions and traditions, with each country producing its 
own specific version or versions of the movement which were far from uniform. Indeed 
the terms which they used themselves or had pinned on them varied, including: 
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‘revolutionary syndicalism’ (France and Britain), ‘industrial unionism’ (America) and 
‘anarcho-syndicalism’ (Spain and Italy).2 Nonetheless, arguably the colloquial description 
of such different movements as ‘syndicalist’ is both useful and justified because it draws 
attention to basic fundamental ideological and practical similarities between them 
(notwithstanding the specific strategic approaches and organisational forms adopted by 
individual movements), as reflected in the cross-fertilisation that took place between 
movements internationally.3
 
  
It was an international syndicalist project characterised by an underlying 
common philosophy of action.  Parliamentary democracy and working for reforms 
through the state were rejected as dead ends. Instead of the social democratic 
conception of socialism introduced from above syndicalism was a movement committed 
to destroying capitalism through extra-parliamentary direct action and revolutionary 
industrial struggle from below.  The principle of complete political independence was 
adopted in response to existing socialist and labour parties – all of whom were 
perceived to be corrupted with electoralism, reformism and bureaucracy. The 
traditional function of trade unions – struggling to better wages and working conditions 
through collective bargaining – was regarded as inadequate. Instead, syndicalists 
campaigned in favour of reconstructed revolutionary trade unions and believed the road 
to the emancipation of the working class lay through an intensification of the industrial 
struggle (involving boycotts, sabotage, strikes and solidarity action) eventually 
culminating in a revolutionary general strike that would lead to the overthrow of the 
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capitalist system and its replacement by workers’ control of industry and society. As the 
decisive agency of workers’ action, revolutionary unionism had a double function – as 
an organ of class struggle against capitalism in the present and as an organ of economic 
and industrial administration after its overthrow in the hoped-for classless society of the 
future.  
 
Also integral to syndicalist philosophy was an anti-patriotic, anti-militarist and 
anti-war stance in which they counter-posed workers’ internationalism to the division 
between nations. In this respect, in an important contribution to our understanding of 
the wider trade union movement’s response to the First World War, Wayne Thorpe has 
argued that European revolutionary syndicalist organisations viewed internationally, 
were unique in not supporting the imperialist ventures of their respective governments. 
Evidence is provided to suggest that support for the war by the important French 
syndicalist organisation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), has obscured the 
fact that five other national syndicalist organisations – in belligerent Germany and Italy, 
and in neutral Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands – remained faithful to their professed 
workers’ internationalism. On this basis, it is argued, syndicalists beyond France, more 
than any other ideological persuasion within the organised trade union movement in 
immediate pre-war and wartime Europe, can be seen to have constituted an authentic 
movement of opposition to the war, refusing to subordinate class interests to those of 
the state, to endorse policies of ‘defencism’ of the ‘national interest’, or to abandon the 
rhetoric of class conflict.4  
 - 5 -  
 
The substantive thrust of Thorpe’s argument is undeniable. Indeed, it was not 
only the great majority of the official leadership of the trade union movement that 
rallied to the national cause. Practically all the leaders of the Second International (the 
collective voice of the world’s socialist parties representing 3 million workers in 27 
different parties), renounced their prior internationalist pledges and rushed to support 
their respective governments’ war drive. This was despite repeated pledges that, in the 
event of war, social democratic parties would ‘do all in their power to utilise the 
economic and political crisis created by the war to arouse the population and to hasten 
the downfall of capitalist class rule’.5
 
 When in August 1914 the German Social 
Democratic Party (the main organisation of the Second International) voted in the 
Reichstag for war credits demanded by the government, its attitude was shared by 
virtually all other major parties of the International. Commitment to the reform of 
capitalism via the existing state led to social democracy’s collapse into defence of 
national interests. By contrast, with its class-based revolutionary aspirations, the 
syndicalists generally took a strong position of opposition to the war on the basis that it 
was purely a conflict of capitalist interests quite unrelated to the interests of the 
working class; a conflict, however, in which the working class would be the major victim, 
sent into senseless slaughter to help line the pockets of the owners of industry.  
Thorpe makes an important contribution by attempting to document the way in 
which within the organised trade union movement, measured internationally, an 
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ideological variable may be said to have determined the response to war in 1914 - one 
which divided syndicalist trade unions from those of every other trend. In stressing this 
point, Thorpe has reinforced the broader historical interpretation of events portrayed 
by a number of contemporary anarcho-syndicalist activists who have endeavoured to 
keep alive the enduring relevance of the tradition.6 As one British author has 
commented: ‘In contrast to the Marxists of the Second International, revolutionary 
syndicalism survived the outbreak of war with its revolutionary credentials intact – the 
CGT was alone in declaring its support for war’.7
 
   
But Thorpe’s contribution is also important for three other reasons. First, as the 
author of the classic monograph The Workers Themselves: Revolutionary Syndicalism 
and International Labour, 1913-1923, as well as a number of journal articles on the 
contribution of syndicalism to working class internationalism, Thorpe is one of the 
foremost historians of the movement, whose work unlike the vast majority of others has 
always concentrated on utilising a comparative dimension - and therefore is particularly 
worthy of serious assessment. Second, his specific analysis of syndicalist opposition to 
the First World War has provided a distinctive and detailed evidence-based academic 
analysis not previously available, and yet remarkably one which has also received 
negligible attention within historiography. Thirdly his analysis has rescued the often 
overlooked syndicalist contribution from right-wing and official Communist/Stalinist 
historians alike8 who have attempted for their own politically biased reasons to dismiss 
the significance of the movement (either as a means of downplaying the radicalism of 
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workers’ unrest on the one hand, or to elevate the general role of communist political 
parties in workers’ struggles on the other). 
  
However, notwithstanding the apparent distinctive nature of the syndicalist 
response to the First World War, Thorpe also acknowledged, although he did not 
emphasise, important qualifications to this stance in certain national contexts - notably 
the collapse into patriotism of the CGT in France (unquestionably the most important 
syndicalist organisation in Europe) and the pro-war ‘interventionist’ minority inside the 
Italian syndicalist movement. Moreover, Thorpe’s study, which provided an essentially 
broad-brush stroke comparative overview, did not explore other ambiguities and 
limitations in syndicalist strategy and tactics more generally, in particular the tensions 
involved in attempting to translate formal syndicalist ideological commitments against 
the war into practical measures of intervention inside the working class movement, and 
the consequences of the syndicalists’ subordination of political issues to the industrial 
struggle. 
 
In an attempt to build on and extend Thorpe’s pioneering contribution, so as to 
explore both the strengths as well as the limitations of the syndicalist stance towards 
the First World War, this article presents a much more disaggregated picture with a 
different and broader geographical field of canvas for study. Thus, as well as re-
evaluating (and providing new evidence on) the syndicalist response in countries such as 
France, Italy and Spain that Thorpe’s work comments on, there is also consideration of 
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other syndicalist or syndicalist-inclined movements in Ireland, Britain and America that 
he omitted. Apart from Italy and Spain, Thorpe’s study looked at Germany, Sweden and 
the Netherlands. My different choice of countries can be justified on the basis of helping 
to illuminate both the significant variations in (subjective) syndicalist response to the 
war internationally (and beyond Europe), as well as the differential influence of 
(objective) national contexts, with the stark choice between workers’ internationalism 
and national patriotism rather more acute in belligerent than in neutral states. In the 
process, the study reveals a rather more nuanced, ambiguous and uneven picture of the 
syndicalist movement to the one presented by Thorpe.  
 
The research, which attempts to contribute to a much neglected comparative 
historiography of the international syndicalist movement, draws primarily on two 
sources: a very extensive range of existing secondary literature, including single-country 
studies on different labour and syndicalist movements as well as (where available) 
comparative overviews on the countries concerned; and a variety of primary sources, 
including the writings of syndicalists (and other contemporary commentators) contained 
in numerous newspapers, pamphlets, books and other archival material.9
 
 
To begin with the article looks at the opposition to war mounted by the 
syndicalists in Spain and Ireland, as well as their varying organisational fortunes amidst 
the relatively favourable context within which they operated. It then contrasts this 
experience with the internal schisms that afflicted the syndicalist movements in 
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belligerent France and Italy, where large segments collapsed into nationalism. The 
article proceeds to make a further contrast with the movements in America and Britain, 
exploring the significance of the syndicalists’ overall ‘anti-political’ stance for their 
opposition to war.  
 
 
Spain and Ireland: anti-war stance, broader beneficiaries 
 
In Spain undoubtedly the clearest and most consistent internationalist opposition 
towards the First World War within the organised labour movement came from the 
syndicalists in the Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (CNT), although this occurred 
within the relatively favourable context of the Spanish government remaining neutral in 
the conflict between the Central and Allied Powers.10 The Socialist Party gradually 
abandoned the pacifist internationalism that had previously led them to condemn 
Spain’s colonial adventure in Morocco, and moved towards an overtly pro-Allied 
interventionist position. By contrast, the CNT professed to see only an equality of war 
guilt among the aggressor ruling classes, insisting it was of no concern to Spanish 
workers which side won, and demanding Spain’s absolute neutrality in the war. Jóse 
Negre, the first secretary of the CNT, even went so far as to declare: ‘Let Germany win, 
let France win, it is all the same to the workers, who will continue to be exploited and 
tyrannised just as before the war, and probably more than before’.11 “Whether one ship 
or a hundred ships be sunk”, commented the confederation’s paper Solidaridad Obrera, 
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‘we do not want war’. It would be far more sensible to use their weapons against ‘more 
immediate enemies’.12
 
  
When the heavily anarcho-syndicalist inclined CNT discovered a number of 
outstanding international anarchist leaders (including Peter Kropotkin) had issued a 
Manifesto of the Sixteen in February 1916 declaring support for the Allied cause (which 
was backed by a small number of important Spanish anarchists), they angrily repudiated 
them. ‘Rather than war – revolution!’, cried the Ateneo Sindicalista of Barcelona in a 
manifesto written by Antonio Loredo and signed by hundreds of organisations.13
 
 The 
only real dissenters from this anti-war orthodoxy were some militants in Galicia and 
Asturias. These ‘minoritarians’ were heatedly denounced by the majority of the 
Catalonian anarcho-syndicalists, and the violent anti-war polemics of Solidaridad Obrera 
(and the anarchist Tierra y Libertad) easily prevailed within the CNT. For example, on 1 
April 1915 Solidaridad Obrera published a very significant statement against the war, 
entitled Manifesto Internacional. In August 1916 an editorial in the paper criticised the 
attitude of those in favour of intervening in the war in the name of liberty or democracy. 
The present war is no different from any of the other wars that have bloodied the world; its 
causes and its ends are identical to those of previous wars. Industrial and commercial prevalence 
is what is being revealed here… 
 
What is so regrettable is that, deceived by the tendentious campaign of the belligerent press, a 
host of sincere militants, instead of preparing for the revolutionary general strike, put their 
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packsacks on their backs, thinking that they really were going to the trenches to defend Liberty 
and Justice.14
 
 
Despite the fact the CNT (who had only just emerged from a period of illegality) 
were in disarray at the beginning of the war with barely 15,000 members, they were 
able to expand to 30,000 by the early part of 1915, and in March 1916 Solidaridad 
Obrera appeared as a daily.15
 
 Their internationalism, albeit essentially propagandist in 
nature, undoubtedly proved attractive to a layer of the most militant workers, but the 
fact that Spain was not itself plunged into participation in the war also meant the hostile 
pressures on the CNT were much less severe than in belligerent countries. Moreover, a 
crucial contributory factor to the organisation’s expanding membership (and of that of 
the socialist-led union confederation the Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) was 
mounting working class opposition to food shortages and speculation arising from the 
war, which fused into underlying discontent with the political regime. The CNT’s 
syndicalist commitment to destroying capitalism through direct action and revolutionary 
industrial struggle meant they were well placed to intervene to take advantage of the 
situation.  
Ironically, despite traditional rivalry with the Socialist Party, now further 
embittered by their opposing stances on the war, rank-and-file pressure for co-
operation between the CNT and the much larger UGT led eventually in July 1916 to the 
Pact of Saragossa. This resulted in a manifesto proclaiming agreement to work together 
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to force the government to take action on the question of living costs and suggested a 
general strike as chief means of exerting pressure. Under the terms of the new accord, 
joint meetings were held in various cities and Spain’s first nationally co-ordinated 24-
hour general strike took place in December 1916. Yet while the total number of strikers 
exceeded the combined membership of the two participating labour confederations, the 
protest made little impact on the government. 
In 1917 political corruption, economic crisis, Catalan regionalism, dissatisfaction 
in the army, the international context – notably the inspiration of the February Russian 
revolution - and a resurgent workers’ movement combined to produce a near 
revolutionary situation in Spain. A movement for liberalisation culminated in a national 
assembly of republican and Catalan deputies in Barcelona in July. The socialists, who 
were particularly keen to see the establishment of a republic as the first stage of the 
‘bourgeois revolution’ prevailed on the CNT to organise jointly a revolutionary general 
strike. But the government, foreseeing the danger, provoked it before it was properly 
organised, and although the strike spread over large parts of Spain it was met with 
fierce repression, particularly in Barcelona where 12,000 troops were concentrated and 
a state of war proclaimed (leaving 70 dead, hundreds wounded and thousands 
arrested). This saw an early end to CGT-UGT collaboration, with the UGT viewing the 
debacle as proof of the incorrectness of the syndicalist general strike tactic, while the 
CNT viewed the socialists’ inadequate tactics and the lack of support from bourgeois 
republicans as proof of the uselessness of collaboration with ‘political’ organisations.  
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Even so, the CNT suffered no great setback from the outcome of the strike. In 
fact, news of the October 1917 Russian Revolution sparked off a three year period of 
unprecedented unrest across the country (Trienio Bolchevista, ‘Three Bolshevik Years’), 
with a series of local general strikes and semi-insurrectionary movements which 
spectacularly helped to further boost CNT membership to 80,500 by the end of the war 
(and to 790,000 by December 1919 in the immediate post-war period, although by 1923 
this had been reduced to a quarter of a million).16
 
 
Meanwhile, in Ireland on the outbreak of war, the main forces of the labour 
movement formally aligned themselves against imperialism, with the Irish Trades Union 
Congress declaring that a ‘European war for aggrandisement of the capitalistic class has 
been declared’ and demanding the retention of foodstuffs in Ireland. Similarly, Jim 
Larkin’s syndicalist-inspired Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) 
responded with a ferocious editorial in the Irish Worker: ‘If England wants an empire let 
her hold the empire. What have we to do with her murderous, grasping, thieving 
work?…Remember by taking Britain’s side in this unholy war you are giving up your 
claim that Ireland is a nation’.17 It was a war for the British Empire and Ireland’s war was 
at home. Larkin’s advice was to: ‘Stop at home. Arm for Ireland. Fight for Ireland and no 
other land’.18 Even if support for such a stance was restricted to a tiny minority in the 
country as a whole, Larkin made anti-war speeches at every opportunity, the ITGWU 
paper Irish Worker was a mélange of anti-war propaganda and the union organised a 
number of small anti-war demonstrations in Dublin.19 
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However, with the outbreak of war occurring in the wake of the crushing defeat 
of the union in the Dublin strike and lockout of 1913, the ITGWU was much too weak to 
launch any industrial action in opposition to either the war or its effects. Instead, it 
looked to the republican Irish Volunteer Force, and made a determined attempt to 
capture it from moderate ‘Home Rule’ supporters by bitterly attacking those prepared 
to accept that the price of a proposed Irish parliament with some limited autonomy 
from British colonial control would have to be the partition of Ireland between north 
and south, insisting this outcome would merely consolidate and strengthen religious 
and sectarian divisions. When the Irish Volunteers’ leader announced his support for 
Britain’s war effort and called on his followers to enlist, Larkin asked the readers of the 
Irish Worker, ‘Is there no man to provide a rope and a tree for this twentieth century 
Judas?’.20
 
  
Larkin left Ireland at the end of October 1914 for what was intended to be a 
short Transport Union fund-raising visit to America, although he was not to return until 
over eight years later. During his supposedly temporary absence the revolutionary 
socialist James Connolly, who had been actively involved with the Industrial Workers of 
the World in America and heavily influenced by syndicalist ideas, was appointed acting-
general secretary of the union, taking over editorship of the Irish Worker and command 
of the union’s own Citizen Army (armed defence force). He issued an appeal for the 
development of full-scale industrial unionism, for small unions catering for general 
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labour to join together with the Transport Union in ‘One Big Union’.21 And Connolly 
advocated a general strike across Europe to stop the war.22
 
 
But despite the best efforts of Larkin, Connolly and their supporters, and the 
overall context of colonial subjugation, opposition to the war in Ireland was 
overwhelmed by a great surge of pro-British sentiment, such that by 1916 about half of 
the ITGWU’s membership had enlisted in the British Army.23
 
 The devastating Dublin 
defeat, combined with the impact of war, produced a collapse in union membership 
from over 30,000 to about 5,000 members by 1916.  
In response, Connolly sought another route to initiate a revolution, becoming 
one of the main instigators and leaders of the Easter Rising of 1916, an insurrection that 
he believed would link the cause of Irish freedom to the wider international battle 
against imperialism.24 Even though Ireland was a tiny country, Connolly thought it could 
play a particularly crucial role by striking a blow against the greatest empire of the day 
based in Britain, and in the process set off a chain reaction: ‘Starting thus, Ireland may 
yet set the torch to a European conflagration that will not burn out until the last throne 
and last capitalist bond and debenture will be shrivelled on the funeral pyre of the last 
war lord’.25
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But despite being the leader of the ITGWU he did not openly campaign for the 
rising among the membership as a whole. Instead he embraced the politics of 
‘militarism’ and exemplary action by a small but determined minority against British 
rule, as advocated by the radical Irish Republican Brotherhood’s Military Council, with 
whom he now allied the tiny forces of the ITGWU’s Citizen Army to become Dublin 
Commander of the combined forces.26 As a result, the 700 Volunteers and 120 Citizen 
Army members who seized control of the centre of Dublin and declared an independent 
Irish Republic did not enjoy popular support and were quickly overwhelmed by the 
British army. Connolly was one of sixteen leaders executed by a British firing squad 
afterwards. Lenin pointed out the tragedy was that the Irish rose ‘prematurely, when 
the European revolt of the proletariat had not yet matured’.27
 
 Indeed they rose before 
war weariness had seriously gripped significant sections of the Irish population.  
Yet following Connolly’s death, the ITGWU, under the leadership of William 
O’Brien, was to experience a remarkable reversal in its fortunes, spectacularly increasing 
its membership to 12,000 by the autumn of 1917 and to over 40,000 by 1918. On one 
level it was a recovery in workers’ confidence to strike which provided the impetus for 
this revitalisation of the union - as the economic grievances of workers, reflected in a 
general wage demand movement throughout Ireland, produced a distinctly syndicalist 
dynamic. From 1917 onwards the spontaneous re-adoption of the Larkinite methods 
used in the Dublin lockout (of the sympathetic strike, refusal to touch ‘tainted’ goods or 
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cross picket lines) attained increasing coherence as it was complemented by the 
practical implementation of Connolly’s ideas of industrial unionism.  
 
Meanwhile, paradoxically, despite the failure of the 1916 rising, the sheer 
ferocity of the British response had the effect of provoking widespread sympathy with 
the aim of ending British rule in Ireland. And the subsequent growing threat to 
introduce conscription in Ireland contributed to turning such sympathy into growing 
militant resistance. In April 1918 there was a huge upsurge of working class activity 
when the Irish Trades Union Congress organised a token but nevertheless successful 
one-day general strike on the conscription issue. Flushed with the success of the strike 
and inspired by news of revolution in Russia, there was a steady rise of industrial protest 
that not only brought another phenomenal spurt of growth for the ITGWU but also 
further encouraged the momentum of the national movement, eventually leading to 
Britain’s humiliating retreat from most of Ireland.28
 
 
Thus, in both Spain and Ireland the syndicalist movements mounted opposition 
to the war, with Spain’s neutrality and Ireland’s colonial status providing the (relatively 
favourable) context within which this took place. Such a stance had real, albeit limited 
and varying, degrees of success in attracting support inside the working class 
movement. But in both countries the syndicalists’ overall wartime growth in numbers 
and influence occurred primarily because they were able to be both beneficiaries of, 
and contributors to, the wartime industrial struggles and broader political issues 
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(beyond the question of the war) that arose. By contrast, in France and Italy the 
situation was much more problematic. 
 
 
France and Italy: internal schisms, patriotism versus internationalism   
 
In France, in the face of the immediate threat of military defeat by Germany, the 
syndicalist movement’s professed internationalism spectacularly collapsed. In fact, the 
CGT can only plausibly be seen as a revolutionary syndicalist body from its inception in 
1902 until the outbreak of the war. There had always been other important forces inside 
the organisation apart from the anti-war revolutionary tendency, notably the pro-war 
reformists. With the onset of hostilities the latter gained the ascendancy and effectively 
became recruiting agents for the imperialist conflict. As a result of their early 
elaboration of syndicalist philosophy, their national prominence and their broader 
influence on the European syndicalist movement generally, the collapse of the French 
CGT was of major significance. 
 
Even though the internationalist principles of the CGT were swept away 
overnight in August 1914 they had made important prior efforts to avert the coming war 
despite growing government repression. Thus, true to syndicalist doctrine the CGT had 
campaigned vigorously against patriotism. The bourgeoisie was viewed as relying upon 
the patriotic sentiments of the workers to distract them from their fundamental 
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economic conflict with capital and to bind them more fully to the defence of bourgeois 
interests; the real division was not between nations but between the exploited and 
exploiters. The CGT’s 1908 Marseille Congress had recalled the formula of the First 
International: ‘The workers have no fatherland!’29
 
 In place of national patriotism, they 
advocated international working class solidarity. 
Such a viewpoint naturally led to a campaign of opposition to the threat of war. 
In 1908 the CGT had openly threatened that any declaration of war should be met with 
a revolutionary general strike, although significantly this resolution was careful to 
commit the confederation to no more than propaganda and to specify that the strike 
should be international. Nonetheless, in 1910, when the delegates of the Second 
International had agreed to turn over the responsibility of deciding anti-war tactics to a 
specially created bureau, 20,000 CGT supporters turned out at the congress of Toulouse 
to protest against war.30 In November 1912 a peace demonstration was staged in Paris, 
attracting some 60,000; and the unions called for a show of force in December, with a 
24-hour general strike which repeated the call for the international working class 
movement to meet the outbreak of war with a revolutionary general strike. Although 
government repression deflected some of the strike’s impact, about 80,000 workers 
were involved in these demonstrations.31
 
 
Despite such revolutionary internationalist sentiments and activities important 
counter-forces were also apparent. The reformists inside the CGT (organised in some of 
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the larger unions and federations) were led by a powerful leadership, who represented 
a sizeable, albeit initially minority, body of opinion within the confederation. While they 
were committed to practical activism and strikes to win material improvements in 
workers’ conditions, they rejected what they considered to be the more violent forms of 
direct action, such as sabotage and the general strike, particularly against the backcloth 
of the hostility of employers (who financed ‘yellow’ unions, imported ‘blacklegs’ and 
hired gunmen to intimidate strikers and pickets) and the Republican state machine 
(which utilised troops to ruthlessly crush the 1909 postal workers’ and 1910 railway 
workers’ strikes). Government concern at CGT anti-war campaigning was reflected in 
the spring and summer of 1913, by police raids of union headquarters and of the homes 
of hundreds of union members, with jail sentences imposed on a number of the 
principal syndicalist leaders (including Griffuelhes, Pouget, Yvetot).  
 
In the context of such strike defeats and state repression, the incoming CGT 
leadership from 1912 onwards, under its new general secretary Leon Jouhaux, began to 
retreat from ‘direct action’ tactics towards a more pragmatic reformist approach. The 
growing war threat also encouraged the CGT leaders to a reluctant acceptance of the 
need to co-operate with reformist Socialist Party politicians.32
 
 
Once war was declared and conscription into the French armed forces 
announced, a wave of patriotism, a deep seated willingness to defend the Republic 
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against external aggression, swept the French labour movement and carried almost the 
whole of the CGT (and the Socialist Party) before it. The CGT’s independent stance 
collapsed and a number of its more militant leaders, as well as Jouhaux, actively 
participated in the war effort. The abandonment of internationalist principles by most 
socialist parties of the Second International, and their active collaboration with 
respective national governments, helped to open the floodgates. Yet the speed with 
which the most ardent French syndicalists (both reformist and revolutionary) became 
recruiting agents for the imperialist conflict was astonishing. For some it may have been 
fear of the consequences that led them to capitulate, with the prospect of illegality, 
persecution and prison; but for many the popular support for the war, a sense of 
patriotism and a genuine fear of the Germans appears to have been enough to send 
them to the front.33 An editorial in La Bataille syndicaliste argued that in the face of 
German militarism the democratic and republican traditions of France needed to be 
safeguarded. France, as Jouhaux repeatedly made clear, was fighting not a war of 
conquest but a war of defence against German imperialism and despotism; it was a war 
for civilisation, for progress and liberty against barbarism, a war of revolution and not 
reaction, truly in the ‘revolutionary tradition’ of 1792.34
 
  
On 4 August the president of the Republic urged all citizens to commit 
themselves to a union sacrée (‘sacred union’) in defence of France, a union that the CGT 
(and Socialist Party) willingly agreed to uphold for the duration. This involved support 
for a no-strike pledge and a programme of compulsory arbitration, with the CGT serving 
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on various mixed commissions and participating in several inter-allied conferences, and 
Jouhaux becoming a ‘commissioner of the nation’. In the process most union members 
of military age were called up without resistance. From 350,000 adherents in 1913, CGT 
membership collapsed in the face of military mobilisation to a mere 49,000 dues-payers 
by 1915, with the CGT becoming a ‘skeletal’ organisation. It was not until 1916-17 that 
membership began to revive to reach pre-war levels, and then doubled to just fewer 
than 600,000 by the end of the war.35
 
 
In spite of the crisis of French syndicalism there emerged a tiny internationalist 
and anti-war minority within the CGT. In December 1914 Pierre Monatte, the leader of 
the new generation of revolutionary syndicalists that had grown up around the paper La 
Vie Ouvrière, publicly resigned from the CGT executive committee in protest at the 
leadership’s refusal to support a peace conference organised by the Scandinavian 
socialist parties. By the second year of the war, the opposition to the CGT had won over 
the powerful metal workers’ union led by Alphonse Merrheim, who made speeches 
insisting ‘their war is not our war’.36 A group of minoritaires formed into a Comité 
Défense Syndicaliste (CDS) and condemned the CGT majority for its collaboration with 
the government (and after 1917 for its alleged timidity in supporting the Russian 
Revolution). In September 1915 Merrheim, accompanied by Albert Bourderon, head of 
the coopers’ union, attended the conference of anti-war socialists held at Zimmerwald 
in Switzerland. Ultimately this group, along with others on the revolutionary wing 
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formed the nucleus of an internationalist and anti-war minority movement within the 
CGT, albeit marginalised during the early stages of the war.37
 
 
An immediate problem faced by those opposed to the war was how best to 
organise their dissent, a job made especially difficult due to the limited means at their 
disposal, the general dislocation of the labour movement, and the government’s policy 
of where possible dispatching militants to the front. For example, when Monatte was 
called up into the army he faced the difficult decision of whether to disobey orders and 
face summary execution, a dilemma resolved only by the advice of his friends that such 
action would be a pointless exercise. In these almost impossible circumstances the 
capacity to sustain an anti-war campaign was limited.38
 
 
However, the catastrophic bloodletting of the years 1914-18 (during which over 
1.3 million were killed), combined with the impact of the Russian Revolution, helped 
transform the situation more favourably during the last eighteen months of the war. 
Widespread army mutinies in May-June 1917 threatened the whole front with collapse. 
In September of that year the socialists, under rising pressure from below, withdrew 
from the Cabinet, and by July 1918 the previous ‘minority’ assumed control of the 
Socialist Party on the platform of a negotiated peace.  
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Above all the strike wave of 1917-18 suggested the union sacrée consensus wore 
thin. Deteriorating working conditions, rising prices, profiteering and war weariness, all 
combined to reduce morale and encouraged growing numbers of workers to lend an ear 
to ‘pacifist and Bolshevik’ doctrines. In May-June 1918 there was a 200,000-strong 
metalworkers’ strike, in which CDS militants played a key role channelling beyond 
bread-and-butter issues into an anti-war protest, although their influence was defused 
by the arrest of strike leaders and transfer of a few hundred mobilisés to the trenches.39
 
 
The immediate post-war years led to an increasing polarisation within the CGT between 
a reformist majority and a revolutionary minority, with the latter receiving a marked 
accession of strength from the Russian Revolution and the dangerously high social 
tensions that the war had generated. The internationalists split away to form the 
Confédération générale du travail (CGTU), a body which eventually became allied to 
communism. 
In Italy, the outbreak of war also created turmoil (albeit on a much less 
significant scale than in France) within the 100,000-strong Unione Sindacale Italiana 
(USI), the largest syndicalist organisation outside of France. The Italian government, 
which had been in alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, had initially declared its 
neutrality. But after ten months Italy finally entered the war in May 1915, joining the 
Anglo-French-Russian alliance. It was a deeply unpopular decision that was opposed by 
parliament, the Catholic Church, the Socialist Party and its trade union confederation. 
The Socialists became the largest political movement in a belligerent state to refuse to 
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endorse the national war effort. As part of this process, the USI also immediately 
avowed opposition to war with its central committee urging on 8 August 1914 that if the 
government abandoned its neutrality all workers should respond with an 
insurrectionary general strike.40
 
 
But although the bulk of the USI remained firm in their anti-militarist and 
internationalist stance, a number of syndicalist leaders, including Alceste DeAmbris, 
Tullio Masoitto and Michele Bianchi, decided to support republican France against the 
absolute monarchies of Germany and Austria and to call for Italian intervention on the 
side of the Allied Powers.41 Such figures, influenced by the republican nationalist 
tradition of Mazzini and the Freemasons, had witnessed the French CGT support the 
union sacrée and concluded that if their parent syndicalist organisation was in favour of 
protecting ‘democracy” against the encroachment of the ‘Hun’, how could the Italian 
syndicalists do anything but follow their lead?42 DeAmbris, the fabled syndicalist leader, 
threw out the challenge: ‘Friends, I ask you a question: What will we do when western 
civilisation is threatened by the suffocating imperialism of Germany and only our 
intervention can save it? I leave the answer to you’.43 He said the greatest menace to 
the revolutionary cause was not a war but rather the threat of a German victory. Such a 
victory, he felt, would destroy the proletarian movement and leave the workers in the 
clutches of German exploiters.44 Thus, the pro-war ‘interventionists’ asserted that while 
the syndicalists were anti-militarist they were not pacifist and the war would provide 
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the opportunity for a revolution that would destroy the liberal political system and the 
monarchy.45
 
 
By contrast, the anarchist wing of the Italian syndicalist movement, led by 
Armando Borghi, demanded that the USI adhere to its internationalism. For Borghi there 
was no compromise with pacifism, it meant a total anti-war stance without regard for 
the Italian nation or any other nation. And in September 1914 the USI executive voted 
to expel DeAmbris and his followers. Even so the Parma Chamber of Labour, the largest 
section of the USI, voted to follow them on the path of intervention, with the Rome and 
Genoa Chambers of Labour (in which syndicalists were prominent) and the Maritime 
Union (an independent union) quickly joining them. And the Unione Sindacale Milanese, 
(the fourth largest section of the USI), also broke with the Milan Chamber of Labour and 
voted to back the interventionists. After this demonstration of support, DeAmbris and 
his followers seized control of the official records, financial statements and membership 
lists of the USI, and quickly converted L’Internazionale, the principal newspaper of the 
Italian syndicalist movement, into a pro-interventionist organ.46
 
 Overall, they succeeded 
in taking almost one-third of the USI’s membership, some 30,000 out of 100,000. Whilst 
the group was too small to be effective on a national scale, it was large enough to 
greatly limit the effectiveness of the USI, even though the bulk of Italian syndicalists 
confirmed their anti-militarism and internationalism.  
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In response to the interventionists, the USI executive selected Bologna as the 
union’s new headquarters and appointed Borghi as secretary general, with Borghi 
attempting to rebuild the Unione by launching an anti-war propaganda offensive via a 
new official journal launched in the spring of 1915, the internationalist Guerra di Classe. 
Nonetheless, Edmondo Rossoni, a long time syndicalist who had participated in the 
1908 Parma general strike, wrote from the United States to express his support for 
DeAmbris,47
 
 and the editor of the Socialist Party’s daily paper (L’Avanti!), Benito 
Mussolini, also began to write in favour of intervention. DeAmbris proceeded to 
establish hard-line groups, labelled Fasci rivoluzionari d’azione (Fasci), which 
increasingly violently attacked anti-war demonstrations. Meanwhile, when Borghi 
rejected a government’s statement that impending Italian participation in the war 
should end the class struggle he was jailed for anti-patriotic remarks and later placed 
under house arrest. The combination of such interventionist attacks and government 
repression forced the USI to move its headquarters once again, this time to Piacenza, 
with their support dwindling as they battled for the next six months in an effort to keep 
Italy out of the war. 
Borghi’s attempt to rebuild the USI was further compounded by the political 
division that existed inside the Italian labour movement more generally. Two days 
before Italy entered the war Enrico Melabandri wrote a long article in Guerra di Classe, 
condemning the idea of unity with the Socialist Party because the latter’s pacifism did 
not have a revolutionary aim and would result in nothing more than support for the 
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existing state structure.48 Both the Socialist Party and its union confederation had 
declared themselves to be neutralist, adopting the formula of ‘né aderire, né sabotare’ - 
refusing to either support the war or sabotage it (for fear disruption would only aid the 
enemy’s ruling class). As a result they refused to work directly with the USI, but likewise 
the USI was not prepared to work with the Socialist Party, even after the latter had 
threatened to call a general strike if Italy did not remain neutral. The USI could not 
accept the fact that the Socialist Party would have political control in calling such protest 
action, since this would amount to a repudiation of their past stance against reformism. 
Thus, almost from the war’s inception, the USI found itself shut off from the main 
segment of the neutralist movement. Such isolation inevitably weakened its position, 
already undermined by the internal split with the interventionists.49
 
 
However, while the internal schism was a crucial factor in the decline of USI 
membership in 1915-16, the war itself was to prove more decisive in affecting the 
syndicalists’ longer-term fortunes. To increase production during the war years the 
government mobilised the Italian working class en masse, with strikes and agitation 
forbidden, under the threat of severe punishment; but it also established tripartite 
industrial commissions to settle industrial disputes on which the socialist-led union 
confederation was invited to elect representatives, thereby enhancing the latter’s role 
and helping to lure thousands of workers away from the USI. What activity the Unione 
undertook tended initially to focus more on its own internal structures, such as 
mounting opposition to the pro-interventionist Parma Chamber of Labour, than with 
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encouraging workers to fight for immediate improvements in wages and conditions. But 
if like other syndicalist organisations, the total membership of the USI declined 
considerably under the initial impact of the war, the organisation could still claim 48,000 
members by the end of 1917.50
 
  
As the war progressed it squeezed the Italian economy hard, leading to bread 
shortages. Strikes broke out over wages, there were large anti-war demonstrations, and 
in August 1917 a spontaneous insurrectionary general strike erupted in Turin inspired by 
news of the February revolution in Russia. Barricades were thrown up in working class 
quarters of the city, with USI activists and anarchists helping to organise defence against 
attack from government troops. The rising lasted four days before being crushed, with 
50 workers killed, and several hundred wounded and arrested. And then in February 
1918 Borghi and other leaders of the USI met with leading left-wing members of the 
Socialist Party (including Serrati) who rejected the official neutralist position, and agreed 
to jointly advocate direct action against the war effort. They envisaged the 
establishment of local anti-war organisations that would campaign to convince soldiers 
that continued fighting was senseless; and a plan was developed to seize arms from the 
munitions depots amidst simultaneous strikes in all armaments factories across 
northern Italy. But the government, informed of the plot, quickly moved to check the 
anti-war group, and imprisoned Borghi for attempting to foment revolution. 
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Despite these apparent setbacks the economic strain of the war in Italy reached 
its height in 1918. As the cost of living increased and purchasing power plummeted, 
more and more workers responded by beginning to organise to defend themselves. For 
many the message of the Bolshevik revolution - immediate peace - appeared to offer 
the most compelling solution, and following the October revolution some 20,000 
workers joined the USI, drawn in part by Borghi’s message that the Italians should ‘Do as 
they did in Russia’. As a result, in the final phase of the war and the immediate post-war 
period the USI expanded rapidly; by the end of 1919 it had enrolled 305,000 members 
and was 300 per cent larger in 1919 than it had been in 1914 (although the socialist 
union confederation exceeded this rate of expansion).51
 
 
The aftermath of war further polarised politics in Italy. On the one hand, 
workers’ revolutionary militancy exploded in the “Bienno Rosso” (“Two Red Years”) of 
1919 and 1920, when huge strikes led to a wave of factory occupations. On the other 
hand, the breakaway interventionists also took advantage of the situation to mobilise 
growing support around the patriotic idea of ‘national syndicalism’. And with the defeat 
of the factory occupations, there was the rise of a mass fascist movement, culminating 
in its seizure of power under Mussolini’s leadership in 1922 and the subsequent 
complete demise of the USI.52
 
 
If in neutral Spain and colonial Ireland syndicalist movements retained their 
opposition to war and were beneficiaries of related industrial and political protest, in 
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both belligerent France and Italy (two of the most important European countries), 
syndicalist movements were bedevilled by internal schisms and external repression that 
undermined the effectiveness of those elements that attempted to hold aloft their 
internationalism and connect it to industrial protest, although significant gains were 
nonetheless eventually achieved. By further contrast, in America and Britain, while 
syndicalists ideologically held firm to an anti-war position, their attempt to translate this 
into practical activity suffered from some strategic and tactical dilemmas.  
 
America and Britain: dilemma of concretising opposition 
 
In America, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) denounced the war on the basis 
that it was a purely capitalist struggle for economic leverage that no worker should 
support. A leaflet prepared by one Wobbly (as IWW members were colloquially known) 
summarised their attitude sharply: ‘General Sherman said “War is Hell!” Don’t go to Hell 
in order to give the capitalists a bigger slice of heaven’.53 Neither the outbreak of the 
war in Europe nor the subsequent intervention of the United States in the spring of 
1917 caused the IWW to change their approach. Wobblies advised American workers to 
remain at home in order to fight the bosses in the only war worthwhile: the class war. 
Bill Haywood, one of the IWW’s most influential leaders, told a protest meeting: ‘It is 
better to be a traitor to your country than to your class. Let the bankers, the rentiers 
and the dividend-takers go to Sherman’s Hell’.54  And the IWW proposed, in the words 
of the editor of its paper Solidarity: ‘to get on the job of organising the working class to 
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take over the industries […] and to stop all future capitalist aggression that leads to war 
and other forms of barbarism’.55
 
 
Paradoxically, unlike elsewhere, the outbreak of war in Europe initially provided 
the occasion and opportunity for the IWW to flourish. Against the background of a tight 
labour market and an economy in which prices rose more quickly than wages, there was 
an increase in labour unrest. Even by the time the United States had itself become a 
belligerent in the war, industrial struggles multiplied, enabling the IWW to expand its 
membership massively as they combined opposition to the war with a successful 
organising campaign in the copper mining industry of Montana and Arizona and the 
lumber industry of the Northwest. For example, in July 1917 25,000 hard-rock miners in 
Arizona took strike action under IWW leadership, paralysing production of copper for 
three months. Between 1916 and 1917 IWW membership almost doubled from 40,000 
to 75,000, and by September 1917 they had between 125-150,000 members.56
 
  
Yet the war years also exposed the limitations in the IWW’s approach to politics 
and the state. While they were able to play a leading role as strike leaders in some 
crucial war industries (advising workers to wage the class war at home even while 
bloody military battles dragged on overseas) their syndicalist rejection of ‘political 
action’ meant they did little in practice to politically oppose the war, despite the initially 
less repressive political context than existed in France or Italy. Thus, they did not 
campaign to oppose the draft, to explicitly disrupt production in the workplace so as to 
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prevent war materials being manufactured or transported, or build a broad-based 
national anti-war movement. Their ambiguous stance was a reflection of their 
syndicalist refusal to explicitly link industrial activity with political ideas and 
organisation. For example, when a member of the IWW wrote to Haywood at the 
national office asking for advice, first having proposed that the organisation declare a 
country-wide general strike if Congress declared American participation in the European 
war, Haywood offered neither support nor counsel. Solidarity’s editor opposed strike 
action against the war:  
 
In case of war we want One Big Union…to come out of the conflict stronger and with more 
industrial control than previously. Why should we sacrifice working class interests for the sake of 
a few noisy and impotent parades or anti-war demonstrations? Let us rather get on with the job 
of organising the working class to take over the industries, war or no war, and stop all future 
capitalist aggression that leads to war and other forms of barbarism.57
 
  
When America’s entry into the war was finally announced the national IWW 
office, under Haywood’s guidance, demanded the Wobblies play down anti-war 
propaganda and concentrate upon ‘the great work of organisation’. The most militant 
member of the IWW leadership, Frank Little, advised members to ‘stay at home and 
fight their own battles with their own enemy – the boss’. But Haywood cautioned: ‘Keep 
a cool head; do not talk. A good many feel as you do but the world war is of small 
importance compared to the great class war…I am at a loss as to define steps to be 
taken against the war’.58 When the government enacted a general conscription law in 
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1917 and the Wobblies were faced with the choice of whether or not to register when 
their draft boards beckoned, Ralph Chaplin used the pages of Solidarity to advise 
members to mark their claims for exemption ‘IWW opposed to war’. But he was 
overruled by Haywood who stressed it was a matter of individual conscience and choice. 
‘The fight of the IWW is one of the economic field’, Haywood said, ‘and it is not for me, 
a man who could not be drafted for war, to tell others that they should go to war, or tell 
them they should not go to war’.59 In the event, roughly 95 per cent of eligible Wobblies 
registered with their draft boards and most of those served when called.60
 
  
The IWW was committed to continuing the class struggle as the war progressed, 
quite unlike the conservative American Federation of Labour (AFL) who collaborated 
with the government. Yet they opposed actively taking up the political issue of the war 
for fear of losing support amongst workers and providing the government with the 
pretext to use the war emergency to repress their organisation. Paradoxically, however 
much IWW-influenced strikes sought conventional labour goals the American state 
interpreted them as direct challenges to the war effort and the legitimacy of federal 
authority. And with the IWW refusing to renounce its commitment to revolution, the 
ruling class became increasingly alarmed by their successes on the industrial front and 
began to whip up huge anti-IWW hysteria as the US prepared to enter the war. The 
Wobblies were branded ‘German spies’ and became a target for ‘patriotic’ violence by 
local vigilantes, leading to the murder of IWW organisers Frank Little and Wesley 
Everett. Nonetheless, strikes continued and a broad-based anti-war movement 
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subsequently developed which provided the opportunity to link workers’ economic 
grievances with political opposition to the war. Instead the IWW chose to ignore this 
‘political’ anti-war movement, even though, ironically, the reformist-led Socialist Party 
began to grow in membership by adopting a formal anti-war stance and attracting to its 
revolutionary wing a new layer of working class activists prepared to campaign in 
opposition to the war. The IWW’s strategy made the government’s task of isolating it 
easier than might have been the case and the organisation suffered heavy state 
repression it was ill-prepared to survive. 
 
Individual states used the excuse of the war to pass criminal syndicalism laws 
making it illegal to advocate the overthrow of the state or the seizure of property, and in 
September 1917 the federal government raided the union’s national, regional and state 
headquarters, arrested over a hundred of the Wobbly leaders and put them on a show 
trial for violating the wartime sedition and espionage laws, sentencing many of them, 
including Haywood, to long prison terms. The IWW never really recovered from these 
attacks and within two years had effectively been destroyed, despite the dramatic 
increase in union militancy across the country that occurred in the initial post-war 
period.61
 
 
In Britain, the organised revolutionary syndicalist movement around Tom Mann’s 
Industrial Syndicalist Education League (ISEL) had already splintered and disintegrated 
over organisational disputes by the outbreak of the war, although a number of 
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individuals remained in prominent positions inside the trade union movement.62 With 
both the Labour Party and trade union leaders seeking to actively encourage 
collaboration with the state to suspend strikes in an ‘industrial truce’, Tom Mann’s 
articles in the Daily Herald provided powerful anti-war statements, and there is no 
evidence of any British syndicalists going over to the pro-war side. But if they did not 
support the war, neither did they play a distinctive role in explicitly campaigning to 
oppose it; in fact Mann attempted to play the role of a ‘responsible patriot’63 
(concerned to defend the interests of labour, but also wanting to see Britain win the war 
so as to prevent the ruling class of Germany gaining ascendancy) calling for peace by 
negotiations.64
 
 
Following an initial lull in workers’ struggle, as the war progressed militancy in 
the munitions factories constituted a major problem for the British government, with a 
powerful engineering Shop Stewards’ and Workers’ Committee Movement led by a 
number of syndicalist-influenced revolutionaries, such as Willie Gallacher, Jack Tanner 
and J.T. Murphy, spearheading resistance to employers and the government. The shop 
stewards’ leaders adopted a position of opposition to the imperialist war and were 
committed to the overthrow of the state that prosecuted it. In the process, they led 
unofficial and illegal rank-and-file strikes that threatened to disrupt the flow of arms, 
irrespective of government attacks and the pro-war policies of the trade union and 
Labour Party leaders. For example, in 1916 they led a successful strike of 12,000 
Sheffield workers to prevent the conscription of an engineer in breach of the 
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government’s pledge to exempt those employed on munitions work, and in May 1917 
led a national strike by 200,000 engineers against an attempt by the government to 
extend ‘dilution’ (the substitution of less skilled for skilled labour). A network of 
Workers’ Committees, representative of workshop organisation and committed to the 
revolutionary goals of workers’ control of production and abolition of capitalism, were 
established across the country. 
 
At the same time, as in America, the shop stewards’ leaders refused to agitate 
politically against the war (albeit from a minority position). Instead they insisted the 
issue was beyond the bounds of the Workers’ Committees’ and that they should limit 
themselves to immediate shopfloor concerns related to wages and conditions. They 
adopted such a stance in the syndicalist belief that maximum unity to win militant 
action on such industrial issues was more important than the broader more hotly 
disputed political questions, including the war, which threatened to puncture such 
unity.65
 
 It was an approach highlighted in sharp relief by the publication of J.T. Murphy’s 
pamphlet The Workers’ Committee, the chief theoretical statement to emerge from the 
National Administrative Council of the shop stewards’ movement. 150,000 copies of the 
document were sold, an indication of its widespread influence.  
Significantly, despite being written in 1917 the pamphlet made absolutely no 
mention of the war and the political issues it raised. Instead, it reduced the immense 
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economic and political problems that lay behind the growth of the Workers’ 
Committees to the level of industrial organisation.66 Even those shop stewards’ leaders 
who were members of revolutionary socialist parties, such as the British Socialist Party 
and the Socialist Labour Party, acted no differently. No doubt Murphy, Gallacher and 
others denounced the war at BSP and SLP meetings, but they made no attempt to 
propagate their views publicly amongst the rank-and-file in the factories for fear of 
losing support, remaining content to merely defend workers against the threats to their 
organisation brought about by the war. In effect, they wore two hats, one reserved for 
their party activities, the other, a shop steward’s hat, to be worn as a representative of 
the rank-and-file, many of whom were, initially at least, pro-war.67
 
 
 Yet in many respects every issue workers faced and every industrial dispute over 
wages and conditions of work was inherently profoundly political, since they all arose 
directly as a result of the government’s determination to win outright victory in the war. 
As a consequence, the extreme political circumstances of the war and the perceived 
failure of the labour leaders to defend workers in the face of an all-out attack by 
employers and the state, opened up possibilities for a class-wide agitation for militant 
trade unionism that fused immediate economic issues with a political challenge to the 
employers and the state over the war. In the event, as Murphy and others were later to 
acknowledge, relying simply on the industrial struggle had the effect of handing the 
political initiative to the ‘patriotic’ reformist labour leadership, isolating the movement 
to the engineering industry and limiting its overall potential.68 Although the end of the 
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war initially saw widespread industrial militancy, with the rundown of the munitions 
industry and subsequent heavy unemployment, it also brought a rapid demise of the 
shop stewards’ movement. 
 
So to recap, in both America and Britain, although they gained significant 
influence and were able to lead important workplace struggles, the syndicalists’ 
tradition of treating politics as something external to the workplace and shopfloor 
unrest as simply an economic issue effectively undermined the impact of their 
internationalist opposition to the war.  
 
 
Assessment 
 
In conclusion, Wayne Thorpe was undoubtedly justified in emphasising the distinctive 
contribution to the fight against the First World War made by revolutionary syndicalists 
in a number of European countries. Unlike the vast bulk of the leaders of the 
mainstream socialist and trade union movement, syndicalists often adopted a 
determined and internationalist stance. No doubt their commitment to working class 
self-emancipation, to revolutionary industrial struggle from below to overthrow 
capitalism rather than reform of the system from above, helps explain the difference in 
approach to the war. Such an internationalist stance contributed, along with the revival 
of workers’ combativity towards the end of the war period, to the growth in 
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membership experienced by different syndicalist organisations, which enabled them to 
influence the ideas and activity of significant minority sections of the working class. 
 
But the evidence presented in this disaggregated study of different national 
contexts also underlines some of the limitations and dilemmas that were involved in the 
syndicalists’ approach. These included the collapse into ‘defencism’ of their respective 
national states amongst significant elements of two of the largest syndicalist 
movements in Europe, and the broader strategic and tactical limits of the syndicalists’ 
antipathy to political parties and subordination of the political question of the war to 
the industrial struggle manifest to a greater or lesser degree in different national 
contexts. Variation in syndicalist response from one movement to another appears to 
have been influenced by a variety of factors, including particular countries’ engagement 
with the war, the economic and political conditions in each country, and the size of 
respective syndicalist organisation, with the absorption of reformist elements within the 
body of the CGT itself, rather than in a rival trade union centre (as elsewhere), a crucial 
factor in explaining why French syndicalism was so different. 
 
Of course, the limitations outlined above by no means undermine Thorpe’s 
substantive attempt to rescue the syndicalist contribution from those historians who 
have overlooked, downplayed or condescendingly dismissed it. But they do qualify the 
picture that he presented.  
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